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TRANSLATING	  MAN	  BACK	  INTO	  NATURE:	  NIETZSCHE’S	  METHOD	  
	  INTRODUCTION	  Nietzsche	  declares	  himself	  to	  be	  committed	  to	  the	  “extravagant	  task”	  that	  is	   “to	   translate	  man	   back	   into	   nature”	   (BGE	   230).1	   He	   does	   not	   think	   there	   is	  anything	   different	   in	   kind	   from	   the	   natural	   world	   and	   much	   of	   his	   writing	  contributes	  to	  the	  project	  of	  understanding	  man,	  culture	  and	  morality	  in	  natural	  as	  opposed	   to	   supernatural	  or	   theistic	   terms.	  He	  asks	   “When	  will	  we	   complete	  our	   de-­‐deification	   of	   nature?”	   (GS	   109)	   In	   this	   respect	   Nietzsche	   is	   far	   from	  untimely	   but	   rather	   a	   product	   of	   his	   age.	  He	   is	   in	   the	   company	   of	   forerunners	  such	  as	  Auguste	  Comte,	  his	  one	  time	  friend	  Paul	  Rée,	  and	  evolutionary	  thinkers	  like	   Herbert	   Spencer,	   in	   considering	   human	   preoccupations	   as	   of	   the	   same	  origins	   as	   the	   animal	   and	   natural	   world.	   Given	   the	   plenitude	   of	   19th	   century	  thinkers	   employing	   the	   tools	   of	   natural	   science	   and	   the	   burgeoning	   human	  sciences	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  understand	  man	  in	  natural	  terms,	  why	  is	  it	  that	  Nietzsche	  considers	  the	  task	  of	  translating	  man	  back	  into	  nature	  to	  be	  an	  “extravagant”	  one	  that	  still	  remains	  to	  be	  achieved?	  Whatever	   its	   continuities	   with	   19th	   century	   naturalistic	   thinking,2	  Nietzsche’s	   naturalism	   must	   also	   be	   understood	   to	   be	   distinct	   from	   other	  thinkers	  who	  share	  in	  a	  broadly	  naturalistic	  approach,	  yet	  whom	  he	  criticizes.3	  I	  take	  naturalism	  to	  encompass	  a	  wide	  range	  of	   thinkers,	   including	  experimental	  scientists	  and	  social	  and	  moral	  philosophers,	  who	  attempt	  to	  explain	  the	  world	  entirely	  in	  natural	  as	  opposed	  to	  supernatural	  or	  otherworldly	  terms.	  Nietzsche,	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however,	  believes	  neither	  the	  experimental	  scientists	  nor	  philosophers	  engaged	  in	   this	  common	  project	  have	  yet	  succeeded	   in	  seeing	   through	   the	   “gold-­‐dust	  of	  unconscious	   human	   vanity”	   in	   order	   to	   discern	   the	   “terrible	   basic	   text	  [schreckliche	  Grundtext]	  homo	  natura”	  (BGE	  230).	  Nietzsche	  recognizes	  that	  how	  to	  translate	  man	  back	  into	  nature	  is	  problematic.	  In	  this	  article,	  I	  explore	  how,	  in	  his	   late	   works,	   he	   would	   have	   us	   attempt	   this	   task.	   I	   will	   demonstrate	   how	  Nietzsche	  believed	  not	  only	  his	  results	  but	  his	  method	  set	  him,	  and	  a	  select	  few	  to	  come	  after	  him,	  apart	  from	  prior	  attempters	  at	  this	  challenge.4	  	  Significant	  scholarship	  has	  been	  undertaken	  which	  traces	  the	  influence	  on	  Nietzsche’s	   thought	   of	   naturalistic	   thinkers.5	   Keith	   Ansell-­‐Pearson’s	   recent	  discussion	   of	   Nietzsche’s	   relationship	   with	   Jean-­‐Marie	   Guyau	   extends	   this	   to	  offer	  an	  exploration	  of	  what	  distinguishes	  Nietzsche	  from	  a	  thinker	  with	  whom	  he	   at	   once	   shares	   so	   much.6	   I	   am	   adding	   to	   this	   existing	   literature	   an	  interrogation	  of	  why	  Nietzsche	  understands	  his	  results	  to	  be	  superior,	  and	  those	  of	  forerunners	  and	  contemporaries,	  even	  of	  Guyau	  whom	  he	  seemingly	  admires,7	  to	   be	   inherently	   limited.	   This	   emphasis	   on	  method	   is	   crucial	   to	   understanding	  what	   is	   distinct	   about	   Nietzsche’s	   thought.	   Nietzsche’s	   explicit	   criticisms	   and	  points	  of	  divergence	   from	  particular	   thinkers	  such	  as	  Comte,	  Rée,	  Spencer,	  and	  Guyau,	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   a	   disagreement	   on	   the	   results	   of	   naturalistic	  investigation.8	   Crucially	   he	   considers	   himself	   to	   be	   going	   about	   the	   task	   of	  understanding	   man	   in	   natural	   terms	   in	   a	   unique	   way.	   He	   offers	   a	   different	  method	  of	  translating	  man	  back	  into	  nature,	  which	  explains	  why	  he	  arrives	  at	  a	  different	   understanding	   of	   the	   text	   that	   underlies	   the	   self-­‐interpretation	  of	   the	  civilized,	   moral	   man.	   Nietzsche	   talks	   about	   natural	   man	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   text,	  precisely	   because	   it	   presents	   a	   problem	   of	   translation.	   The	   constitution	   of	   the	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moral	  subject	  has	  involved	  the	  sublimation	  of	  the	  multiple	  drives	  at	  work	  within	  us,	  which	  Nietzsche	  will	  come	  to	  elaborate	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power.	  	  	  Nietzsche	  takes	  all	  possible	  subjects	  of	  investigation	  to	  be	  natural.	  In	  the	  task	   of	   translating	   man	   back	   into	   nature	   he	   employs	   an	   empirical	   method	   of	  investigation	   that	   incorporates	   this	   assumption.	   Hence,	   he	   is	   in	   an	   important	  sense	  a	  methodological	  naturalist,	  as	  Brian	  Leiter	  designates	  him,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  sense	   which	   Leiter	   proposes.	   Leiter	   defines	   methodological	   naturalism	   as	   the	  requirement	  that	  enquiry	  is	  ‘continuous	  with	  empirical	  enquiry	  in	  the	  sciences’,	  it	  thus	  cannot	  proceed	  entirely	  a	  priori.	  9	  Leiter	  suggests	  that	  this	  continuity	  can	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  results	  continuity,	  where	  a	  criterion	  for	  philosophical	  conclusions	  is	  that	  they	  are	  compatible	  with	  our	  best	  scientific	  conclusions,	  or	  in	  terms	  of	  method	  continuity.	  Method	  continuity,	  Leiter	  claims,	  involves	  taking	  on	  the	   supposition	   that	   phenomena	   have	   deterministic	   causes.	   He	   argues	   that	  Nietzsche	  is	  a	  methodological	  naturalistic	  because	  he	  offers	  causal	  explanations	  of	   phenomena.	   Leiter	   argues	   further	   that,	   given	   Nietzsche’s	   investigation	   into	  morality	  takes	  man	  to	  be	  of	  natural	  origins,	  his	  philosophy	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  some	  extent	  to	  demonstrate	  ‘results	  continuity’	  with	  existing	  scientific	  thinking,	  fitting	  with	  developments	  in	  evolutionary	  theory.10	  	  Leiter’s	   characterization	   of	   Nietzsche’s	   naturalism,	   however,	   does	   not	  explain	   what	   distinguishes	   Nietzsche	   from	   the	   naturalists	   whom	   he	   criticizes.	  Nietzsche’s	  methodological	  naturalism	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  to	  continuity	  with	  any	  prior	  examples	  of	  scientific	  method.	  Rather	  we	  must	  explore	  what	  new	  method	  his	   philosophy	   offers	   us.	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   in	   what	   sense	   Nietzsche	   is	   a	  methodological	   naturalist	   we	   need	   to	   clarify	   both	   what	   Nietzsche	   praises	   in	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scientific	  method	   and	  what	   practices	   and	   virtues	   he	   thinks	   have	   hitherto	   been	  lacking	  in	  our	  pursuit	  of	  knowledge.	  	  I	   will	   proceed	   by	   discussing	   two	   naturalistic	   thinkers,	   Rée	   and	   Guyau,	  whose	  work	   Nietzsche	  was	  well	   acquainted	  with,	   and	   in	  what	  ways,	   from	   the	  Nietzschean	   perspective,	   they	   do	   not	   go	   far	   enough	   in	   revealing	   what	   lies	  beneath	  man’s	  “many	  vain	  and	  fanciful	  interpretations	  and	  secondary	  meanings”	  (BGE	  22).	  My	  point	  is	  not	  to	  offer	  an	  exhaustive	  discussion	  of	  their	  relationship	  which	  has	  been	  documented	  elsewhere	  but	  to	  emphasize	  the	  aspect	  of	  method,	  which	   allows	   us	   to	   understand	   why	   Nietzsche	   thinks	   their	   projects	   remain	  unsatisfactory.	   Having	   sketched	   where,	   for	   Nietzsche,	   the	   right	   naturalistic	  method	  leads	  us,	  namely	  his	  understanding	  of	  man	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power,	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  why	  these	  thinkers	  have	  failed	  in	  the	  task	  of	  translating	  man	  back	  into	   nature	   and	   outline	   the	   method	   that	   Nietzsche	   thinks	   is	   required	   for	   its	  successful	   completion.	   I	   will	   argue	   that	   Nietzsche’s	  methodological	   naturalism	  cannot	   be	   separated	   from	   what	   Lawrence	   Hatab	   designates	   as	   his	   existential	  naturalism.11	   Nietzsche’s	   naturalistic	   method	   is	   not	   restricted	   to	   a	   theoretical	  level,	  or	  the	  criteria	  of	  investigation,	  as	  Leiter’s	  characterization	  of	  his	  naturalism	  would	  have	   it.12	  Rather	   it	  requires	  us	  to	   live	  a	  certain	  way.	  Further,	  a	  complete	  understanding	  of	  man	  in	  natural	  terms,	  which	  can	  only	  be	  achieved	  through	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  method,	   is	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  an	  existential	  naturalism	  or	  as	  Hatab	  puts	   it	  a	  “revaluation	  of	  meaning	  in	  different	  terms	  according	  to	   immediate	   life	  conditions”.13	  Thus,	  the	  translation	  of	  man	  back	  into	  nature	  is	  at	  once	  a	  question	  of	  understanding	  man	  in	  naturalistic	  terms	  and	  a	  re-­‐naturalization	  of	  man,	  which	  goes	  beyond	  existing	  methodological	  naturalism.	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  NIETZSCHE’S	  RELATIONSHIP	  TO	  RÉE	  AND	  GUYAU	  I	   turn	   now	   to	   a	   consideration	   of	   naturalistic	   thinkers	   who	   Nietzsche	  would	   set	   himself	   apart	   from.	   Much	   recent	   Nietzsche	   scholarship	   emphasizes	  naturalistic	   strains	   in	   Nietzsche’s	   thought.14	   One	   ground	   that	   is	   offered	   to	  support	   the	   importance	  of	  naturalism	  to	  his	  philosophy	   is	   the	  evidence	   that	  he	  read	   and	  was	  positively	   influenced	  by	  naturalistic	   thinkers.	   Two	   such	   thinkers	  whose	  work	  at	  one	   time	   struck	  a	   cord	  with	  Nietzsche	  are	  Rée	  and	  Guyau.	   It	   is	  worth	  exploring	  how	  Nietzsche	  stands	  apart	   from	  these	  naturalistic	   thinkers	   in	  particular	  precisely	  because	  of	  the	  positive	  influences	  and	  connections	  they	  have	  with	  him.	  	  Rée’s	   influence	   is	   widely	   recognized	   and	   Nietzsche’s	   acquaintance	   with	  his	  work,	  which	  continued	  beyond	  their	  friendship,	  has	  been	  detailed	  by	  Thomas	  Brobjer.15	   Rée	   was	   both	   a	   significant	   positive	   influence	   on	   Nietzsche	   and	  provides	  a	  source	  of	  opposition	  that	  shapes	  Nietzsche’s	  own	  presentation	  of	  the	  history	  of	  morality.	  Rée’s	  work	  explores	  the	  development	  of	  moral	  sentiments	  in	  the	   context	   of	   psychological	   and	  biological	   understandings	   of	   human	  behavior.	  Nietzsche	  wrote	  Human	  all	   too	  Human	   in	  the	  company	  of	  Rée,	  and	  even	  quotes	  from	   Rée’s	   forthcoming	   The	   Origins	   of	   Moral	   Feeling	   (Der	   Ursprung	   der	  
moralischen	  Empfindungen)	  with	  approval	   in	  this	  work	  (HH	   I	  37).16	  This	  period	  marks	   for	   Nietzsche	   a	   decisive	   turn	   towards	   natural	   science	   as	   a	   source	   of	  inspiration	   in	   his	   explanations	   for	   human	   behavior	   and	   his	   engagement	   with	  natural	  science	  is	  associated	  with	  his	  friendship	  with	  Rée,	  the	  two	  being	  mutually	  reinforcing.17	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Nietzsche’s	   encounter	   with	   Guyau’s	   thinking	   came	   later.	   He	   first	   read	  Guyau’s	  A	  Sketch	  of	  Morality	   Independent	  of	  Obligation	  or	  Sanction	   in	  1885	  and	  his	  Non	  Religion	  of	  the	  Future	  in	  1887.18	  Following	  Thomas	  Brobjer’s	  chronicling	  of	   Nietzsche’s	   reading	   of	   Guyau,	   Ansell-­‐Pearson	   has	   recently	   considered	   their	  intellectual	  relationship.19	  Perhaps	  even	  more	  than	  with	  the	  Nietzsche	  of	  Human	  
all	  too	  Human	  and	  Rée,	  the	  points	  of	  similarity	  between	  Nietzsche’s	  later	  thinking	  and	  Guyau	  are	   striking.	  At	   the	   same	   time	  as	  exploring	   their	  differences	  Ansell-­‐Pearson	  highlights	  the	  significant	  common	  ground	  that	  exists	  between	  them.	  He	  shows	  that	  both	  Nietzsche	  and	  Guyau	  are	  engaged	  in	  developing	  a	  notion	  of	  life	  that	  would	  allow	  us	   to	  understand	  existence	   in	  monistic	   terms.20	  Further,	  both	  understand	  morality	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  conception	  of	  life.	  Guyau	  is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  defender	   of	  moral	   dogma.	  He	  warns	   against	   our	   allowing	  moral	   dogmatism	   to	  take	   the	   place	   of	   religious	   dogmatism	   and	   criticizes	  making	   duty	   into	   the	   new	  God.21	  Guyau	  even	  expresses	  a	  concern	  lest	  the	  ideas	  of	  Mill	  and	  Comte	  take	  the	  form	  of	  cult	  worship.	  “Love	  of	  humanity	  is	  one	  thing,	  and	  idolatry	  of	  humanity,	  or	  sociolatry,	  according	  to	  Comte’s	  term,	  is	  another.”22	  	  So	   in	   what	   sense	   then,	   given	   they	   share	   with	   Nietzsche	   the	   aim	   of	  understanding	  moral	  man	  in	  natural	  terms,	  various	  points	  of	  agreement	  in	  their	  explanations,	  and	  an	  opposition	  to	  existing	  dogma,	  have	  Rée	  and	  Guyau	  failed	  to	  translate	  man	  back	  into	  nature?	  While	  they	  have	  attempted	  to	  understand	  man	  in	  natural	   terms	  they	  have	  not	  recognized	  the	  basic	  text	   that	  will	  challenge	  not	  only	   the	  myths	  of	  morality’s	  origins,	  but	  our	   faith	   in	   the	  desirability	  of	   its	   core	  values.	   Rée,	   while	   exposing	   the	   vanity	   and	   egoism	   that	   is	   often	   behind	   our	  actions	  continues	  to	  believe	  that	  we	  are	  also	  capable	  of	  genuinely	  disinterested	  pity.23	  He	  believed	  that	  we	  had	  evolved	  to	  possess	  some	  selfless	  instincts.24	  For	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Guyau	   in	   turn,	   “To	   live	   fully	  and	  completely	  one	  must	   live	   for	  others”.25	  Guyau,	  while	  providing	  much	  inspiration	  for	  Nietzsche,	   is	  sharply	  distinguishable	   from	  him	  because	  he	   remains	  committed	   to	  a	  belief	   in	   the	   importance	  of	  altruism,	  a	  central	   value	  of	   the	  Christian	  morality	   that	  Nietzsche	  would	  have	  us	   reject.	  As,	  Thomas	  Brobjer	  suggests,	   in	  1887	  Nietzsche	  “seems	  to	  have	  regarded	  Guyau	  as	  the	   sort	   of	   free	   thinker	   who	   rejects	   Christianity	   but	   holds	   on	   to	   Christian	  morality”.26	  While	  no	  defender	  of	   the	   status	  quo,	  Guyau	  does	  not	   take	  his	  own	  naturalistic	   analysis	   of	   human	  morality	   to	   be	  undermining	  of	   the	  possibility	   of	  altruistic	   morality.	   He	   suggests	   that	   “associations	   for	   moral	   purposes”	   will	  survive	  the	  decline	  of	  religion	  and	  be	  “based	  on	  a	  consciousness	  of	  the	  solidarity	  and	   fraternity	   of	  mankind”.27	  While	   Guyau,	   according	   to	   his	   fellow	   Frenchman	  Alfred	  Fouillèe,	  “sees	  the	  genuinely	   intense	  life	   in	  the	  generous	  and	  fruitful	   life,	  which	  ‘lives	  for	  many	  others’	  […]	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  Nietzsche,	  in	  the	  name	  of	  life,	  simply	   and	   entirely	   does	   away	   with	   morality”.28	   Though	   Nietzsche	   may	   value	  aspects	  of	  morality,	  such	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  asceticism	  necessary	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  knowledge,	  he	  intends	  his	  analysis	  to	  challenge	  not	  simply	  theistic	  conceptions	  of	  morality,	   but	   the	  values	  of	   altruism	  and	   compassion	   that	   are	   embedded	   in	  our	  existing	   moral	   culture.	   He	   warns:	   “Where	   compassion	   [Mitleiden]	   and	   fellow-­‐suffering	   is	  preached	   today	  –	  and,	  heard	  aright,	  no	  other	   religion	   is	  any	   longer	  preached	  now	  –	  the	  psychologist	  should	  prick	  up	  his	  ears:	  through	  all	  the	  vanity,	  all	   the	  noise	   characteristic	   of	   these	  preachers	   (as	   it	   is	   of	   all	   preachers)	   he	  will	  hear	   a	   hoarse,	   groaning,	   genuine	   note	   of	   self-­‐contempt.”	   (BGE	   222)29	   For	  Nietzsche,	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  recognize	  that	  morality	  has	  historical	  and	  biological	  roots.	  He	  hopes	  to	  lead	  a	  select	  audience	  to	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  it	  has	  been	  damaging	  to	  life	  and	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  higher	  types.	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  THE	  WILL	  TO	  POWER	  The	  basic	  text	  of	  humanity,	  not	  recognized	  by	  others	  who	  have	  attempted	  to	  translate	  man	  back	  into	  nature,	  which	  will	  challenge	  this	  faith	  in	  altruism	  and	  the	  positive	  role	  of	  morality,	   is	  understood	  by	  Nietzsche	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  will	   to	  power.30	  To	  understand	  how	  various	  instincts	  have	  come	  to	  be	  sublimated	  in	  the	  taming	  of	  man,	  the	  process	  in	  which	  various	  wills	  to	  power	  have	  competed	  and	  developed	  has	  to	  be	  unpacked	  or	  translated.	  Nietzsche	  comes	  to	  understand	  all	  motivations	  and	  instincts	  offered	  as	  explanations	  of	  human	  behavior	  in	  terms	  of	  the	   principle	   of	   will	   to	   power:	   “This	   world	   is	   the	   will	   to	   power-­	   and	   nothing	  
besides!	  And	  you	  yourselves	   too	   are	   this	  will	   to	  power	  –	   and	  nothing	  besides!”	  (KSA	  11:	  38[12]/	  WP	  1067).	  
	  Nietzsche’s	  understanding	  of	  life,	  and	  explanation	  of	  all	  there	  is,	  in	  terms	  of	   will	   to	   power	   is	   influenced	   both	   by	   his	   psychological	   observations	   and	   his	  readings	   from	  the	  natural	  sciences.	  Observations	  concerning	   the	  significance	  of	  our	   desire	   for	   power	   precede	   Nietzsche’s	   mature	   formulation	   of	   the	   will	   to	  power.	   In	   his	   discussion	   of	   asceticism	   in	   Human,	   all	   too	   Human	   Nietzsche	  connects	  it	  to	  a	  sublimated	  “defiance	  of	  oneself”	  in	  some	  men,	  which	  is	  explained	  by	  “a	  need	  to	  exercise	  their	  strength	  and	  lust	  for	  power	  that	   in	  default	  of	  other	  objects	  or	  because	  their	  efforts	  in	  other	  directions	  have	  always	  miscarried,	  they	  at	   last	  hit	  upon	   the	   idea	  of	   tyrannizing	  over	   certain	  parts	  of	   their	  own	  nature”	  (HH	   I	  137).	  Nietzsche’s	   early	   recognition	  of	   the	  explanatory	   significance	  of	  our	  sublimated	  desire	  to	  feel	  power	  in	  action	  reaches	  fruition	  in	  his	  concept	  of	  a	  will	  to	  power.	  As	  he	  refines	  his	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  will	  to	  power	  Nietzsche	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postulates	   that	   the	   activity	   of	   all	   our	   drives	   and	   instincts	   are	   ultimately	   to	   be	  comprehended	   as	   the	   activity	   of	   will	   to	   power.	   He	   claims:	   “our	   drives	   can	   be	  reduced	  to	  the	  will	  to	  power”	  (KSA	  11:	  40[661]).	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  as	  the	  will	  to	  power	  explains	  the	  development	  and	  activity	  of	  the	  drives,	  our	  experience	  of	  our	  own	  need	  to	  assert	  and	  express	  our	  drives,	  and	  to	   feel	   the	  sense	  of	  power	  that	  this	  allows,	  gives	  content	  to	  the	  will	  to	  power	  as	  an	  explanatory	  concept.	  	  Neither,	  however,	  the	  sources	  for	  his	  understanding	  of	  what	  will	  to	  power	  is,	   nor	   its	   extension	   as	   a	   principle	   of	   explanation,	   are	   limited	   to	   human	  psychology.	   Both	   Wolfgang	   Müller-­‐Lauter	   and	   Gregory	   Moore	   have	   drawn	  attention	   to	   the	   significant	   influence	   of	   biological	   and	   physiological	   theory	   on	  Nietzsche’s	   work	   pointing	   to	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   will	   to	   power	   in	   this	  context.31	   Michael	   Forster,	   whose	   1877	   Textbook	   in	   Physiology,	   Nietzsche	  possessed	  in	  the	  German	  translation,	  even	  uses	  the	  expression	  ‘will’	  to	  describe	  an	   amoeba	   without	   attributing	   this	   will	   to	   any	   particular	   cell	   within	   it.32	  Nietzsche	   was	   aware	   of	   developments	   in	   cell	   biology,	   which	   he	   would	   have	  encountered	   in	   his	   reading	   of	   Friedrich	   Lange,	  who	  discusses	   the	  multicellular	  structure	   of	   organisms,	   drawing	   on	   the	   likes	   of	   pathologist	   Rudolf	   Virchow	  (1821-­‐1902).33	   That	  Nietzsche	   takes	   on	   this	   language	   of	   physiological	   struggle	  and	  multiplicity	  in	  his	  development	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  unpublished	   notes.	   For	   example,	  we	   find:	   “The	  will	   to	   power	   can	   only	   express	  itself	  against	  resistance,	  it	  seeks	  what	  will	  resist	  it	  –	  this	  is	  the	  original	  tendency	  of	  protoplasm	  in	  sending	  out	  pseudopodia	  and	  feeling	  its	  way.	  Assimilation	  and	  incorporation	   is,	  above	  all,	  a	  willing	   to	  overwhelm”	  (KSA	  12:	  9[151]/	  WP	  656).	  The	  need	  to	  expand	  and	  assert,	  to	  feel	  and	  express	  power,	  explains	  what	  a	  need	  to	   preserve	   and	   simply	   continue	   cannot.	   For	   instance,	   “protoplasm	   takes	   into	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itself	   an	   absurdly	   greater	   amount	   than	   it	   would	   need	   for	   preservation:	   and,	  above	  all,	  the	  point	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  thereby	  ‘preserve	  itself’,	  but	  disintegrates”	  (KSA	   13:	   11[121]/	   WP	   651).	   Will	   to	   power	   explains	   why	   protoplasm	  incorporates	  more	  than	  is	  required	  for	  self-­‐preservation.	   It	  explains	  how	  forms	  of	  life	  incorporate	  one	  another,	  changing	  in	  this	  incorporation,	  and	  how	  division	  or	  destruction	  of	   forms	  of	   life	  may	  occur,	  allowing	   the	  continued	  expression	  of	  will	  to	  power	  rather	  than	  the	  static	  perpetuation	  of	  fixed	  forms.	  	  As	  an	  explanation	  of	  all	  there	  is,	  the	  will	  to	  power	  is	  a	  monistic	  theory	  in	  that	  everything	  is	  of	  the	  same	  character.	  This	  character,	  of	  needing	  to	  assert	  and	  incorporate,	   explains	   the	   development	   and	   continuity	   of	   different	   forms.	   This	  explanation	  presupposes	  a	  plurality	  rather	  than	  a	  unity.	  Will	  to	  power,	  can	  only	  be	   identified	  where	   resistance	   is	   felt:	   “Aversion	   is	   felt	   through	   resistance:	   but	  power	   can	   only	   become	   aware	   of	   itself	   through	   resistance,	   thus	   aversion	   is	   a	  necessary	   ingredient	  of	  all	   action	   (all	   action	   is	   justified	  against	   something,	   that	  must	   be	   overcome)	   The	   will	   to	   power	   strives	   against	   opposition,	   against	  aversion.”	  (KSA	  11:	  26[275])	  As	  Müller-­‐Lauter	  argues,	  given	  that	  “will	  to	  power	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  only	  reality,	  what	  can	  offer	  resistance	  to	  it	  can	  likewise	  be	  only	  will	  to	  power”.	   	  Hence,	  the	  expression	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power	  “presupposes	  a	  multitude	  of	  wills	  to	  power”.34	  What	  we	  can	  learn	  by	  examining	  organic	  life	  in	  all	  forms	  is	  supported,	  and	  ultimately	  incorporated	  as	  a	  truth	  for	  us,	  by	  considering	  our	  own	  drives,	  and	  our	  experience	   of	   the	   feeling	   of	   power	   in	   their	   expression.	   Nietzsche’s	   use	   of	  physiology	   comes	   together	   with	   his	   psychological	   insights	   to	   produce	   the	  hypothesis	   of	   the	   world	   as	   made	   up	   of	   multiple,	   active	   wills	   to	   power.	   His	  explanations	   of	   phenomena,	   including	   the	   establishment	   of	   our	  moral	   culture,	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depend	   on	   there	   being	   dynamic,	   competing	  wills	   to	   power,	   such	   as	   the	  will	   to	  power	   of	   the	   weak,	   which	   creates	   the	   ascetic	   ideal	   in	   reaction	   to	   the	   will	   to	  power	   of	   the	   strong	   (GM	   I	   10).	   Insofar	   as	   these	   are	   convincing	   explanations,	  Nietzsche	   justifies	   the	   claim	   that	   underlying	   our	   behavior	   are	   a	  multiplicity	   of	  wills	  to	  power.	  These	  plural	  wills	  are	  all	  of	  the	  same	  fundamental	  nature.	  Their	  explanatory	  capacity	  relies	  on	  the	  interaction	  and	  resistance	  between	  them	  and	  this	   assumes	   both	   their	   plurality	   and	   dynamic,	   expanding	   character.	   John	  Richardson	   describes	   how	   this	   expansion	   can	   be	   qualitative	   as	   well	   as	  quantitative,	   in	   incorporating	   other	   wills	   to	   power	   a	   will	   to	   power	   can	  incorporate	  a	  greater	  variety	  of	  patterns,	  occupying	  more	  perspectives	  or	  using	  different	   drives.35	   Several	   wills	   to	   power	   can	   be	   synthesized	   into	   whole	  organisms	  or	  societies.	  	  Nietzsche’s	  critique	  of	  morality	   in	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  Morality	  employs,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  develops	  and	  expresses,	  this	  concept	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power.	  Moral	  and	  cultural	  phenomena	  are	  continuous	  with	  “the	  organic	  world	  [which]	  consists	   of	   overpowering,	   dominating,	   and	   in	   their	   turn,	   overpowering	   and	  dominating	  consist	  of	  re-­‐interpretation,	  adjustment,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  which	  their	  former	   ‘meaning’	   [Sinn]	   and	   ‘purpose’	   must	   necessarily	   be	   obscured	   or	  completely	   obliterated.”	   (GM	   II	   12)	   The	   will	   to	   power	   shapes	   the	   meaning	   of	  things	  in	  an	  ongoing	  process:	  “every	  purpose	  and	  use	  is	  just	  a	  sign	  that	  the	  will	  to	  power	  has	  achieved	  mastery	  over	   something	   less	  powerful,	   and	  has	   impressed	  upon	  it	  is	  own	  idea	  [Sinn]	  of	  a	  use	  function;	  and	  the	  whole	  history	  of	  a	  ‘thing’,	  an	  organ,	   a	   tradition	  can	   to	   this	  extent	  be	  a	   continuous	  chain	  of	   signs,	   continually	  revealing	  new	  interpretations	  and	  adaptations”	  (GM	  II	  12).	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This	   notion	   of	  multiple	   and	   dynamic	  wills	   to	   power	   as	   the	   explanatory	  force	  behind	  human	  culture	  and	  activities	  is	  again	  expressed	  in	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  
Evil	  where	   Nietzsche	   speaks	   of	   the	   task	   of	   translating	   man	   back	   into	   nature.	  Though	   Nietzsche	   does	   not	   here	   use	   the	   phrase	   ‘will	   to	   power’	   he	   describes	  “what	   the	   people	   calls	   ‘spirit’	   [Geist]”	   in	   terms	   that	   resonate	  with	   his	  Nachlass	  discussions	   of	   the	   will	   to	   power	   discussed	   above.	   	   “‘Spirit’	   [Geist]”	   he	   claims	  “wants	   to	   be	   master	   within	   itself	   and	   around	   itself	   and	   to	   feel	   itself	   master”.	  Nietzsche	  describes	   its	   “intention”	   in	  assimilating,	  simplifying,	   falsifying	  as	  “the	  incorporation	   of	   new	   ‘experiences’,	   the	   arrangement	   of	   new	   things	   within	   old	  divisions	  	  -­‐	  growth;	  that	  is	  to	  say	  more	  precisely,	  the	  feeling	  of	  growth,	  the	  feeling	  of	  increased	  power.”	  (BGE	  230)	  This	  understanding	  of	  life	  as	  will	  to	  power,	  and	  all	  phenomena	  in	  terms	  of	  this	   conception	   of	   life,	   implies	   a	   critical	   appraisal	   of	   human	   morality.	   Where	  Guyau	  speaks	  of	   the	  desire	  to	  sacrifice,	  Nietzsche’s	  annotations	  on	  his	  personal	  copy	   counter:	   “life	   is	   above	   all	   concerned	   with	   power”.36	   Thus,	   Nietzsche	  understands	  his	  concept	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power	  as	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  belief	  in	   life’s	   inherent	   tendency	   to	   altruism	   that	   can	   be	   found	   in	   thinkers	   such	   as	  Guyau.	   For	  Nietzsche,	   a	   translation	   of	  man	   back	   into	   nature,	   conducted	   by	   the	  right	  method,	   finds	   only	  will	   to	   power,	  which	   explains	   the	   development	   of	   the	  values	  of	  pity	  and	  altruism	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  need	  of	  the	  sick,	  and	  the	  priestly	  caste,	  to	  feel	  power.	  	  The	  weak	  required	  these	  evaluations	  against	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  strong.	  This	  morality	  allows	  the	  sick	   to	  assert	   themselves	  against	   the	  healthy	  and	  thus	  express	  their	  weak	  will	  to	  power	  and	  to	  continue	  living.	  “The	  will	  of	  the	  sick	  to	  appear	  superior	  in	  any	  way,	  their	  instinct	  for	  secret	  paths,	  which	  lead	  to	  tyranny	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over	  the	  healthy,	  -­‐	  where	  can	  it	  not	  be	  found,	  this	  will	  to	  power	  of	  precisely	  the	  weakest!”	  (GM	  III	  14)	  The	  need	  for	  the	  ascetic	  ideal,	  and	  its	  practices	  of	  altruism	  and	   compassion,	   springs	   from	   sickness:	   “the	   ascetic	   ideal	   springs	   from	   the	  
protective	  and	  healing	  instincts	  of	  a	  degenerating	  life,	  which	  uses	  every	  means	  to	  maintain	   itself	   and	   struggles	   for	   its	   existence”.	   (GM	   III	   13)	  Nietzsche	   considers	  these	   values,	   despite	   serving	   to	   allow	   the	   sick	   to	   cling	   to	   life,	   to	   express	   an	  evaluative	   opposition	   to	   life,	   understood	   as	  will	   to	   power.	   The	   example	   of	   the	  moral,	  pious	  man	  condemns	  the	  inherent	  character	  of	   life	  to	  express	  power	  “as	  though	   health,	   success,	   strength,	   pride	   and	   the	   feeling	   of	   power	   were	   in	  themselves	   depravities”	   (GM	   III	   14).	   Christianity,	  which	   has	   championed	   these	  values,	   “has	   made	   an	   ideal	   out	   of	   opposition	   to	   the	   preservative	   instincts	   of	  strong	  life”	  (AC	  5).	  Thus,	  given	  Nietzsche’s	  concern	  with	  the	  need	  to	  protect	  and	  cultivate	   the	   healthy	   and	   strong,	   morality,	   which	   is	   fundamentally	   sick	   and	  opposed	  to	  the	  character	  of	  life	  as	  will	  to	  power,	  must	  be	  overcome.37	  	  	  NIETZSCHE’S	  METHODOLOGICAL	  NATURALISM	  	  The	  question	   I	  wish	   to	   focus	  on	   for	   the	   remainder	  of	   this	   article	   is	  why	  Nietzsche	   believes	   that	   thinkers	   such	   as	   Rée	   and	   Guyau	   stop	   short	   in	   their	  analysis	  and	  are	  blind	  to	  the	  character	  of	  life	  which	  he	  sees	  as	  will	  to	  power,	  and	  thus	  to	  the	  need	  to	  overcome	  a	  morality	  that	  stifles	  this	  character.	  For	  Nietzsche,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  transparent	  knowledge	  of	  ourselves	  but	  rather	  face	  the	  challenge	  of	   translating	   the	   cultural	   and	   moral	   language	   in	   which	   our	   existing	   self-­‐interpretations	  operate.	  Nietzsche	  claims	  that	  he	  has	  “an	  unconquerable	  distrust	  in	  the	  possibility	  of	  self-­‐knowledge	  that	  has	  led	  me	  to	  the	  point	  where	  I	  sense	  a	  
contradiction	   in	   adjecto	   in	   even	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘immediate	   knowledge’	   that	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theoreticians	  permit	  themselves”	  (BGE	  281).	  Thus	  a	  methodology	  of	  translation	  is	  required	  to	  achieve	  self-­‐knowledge	  and	  decipher	  the	  process	  in	  which	  our	  self-­‐interpretation	   has	   been	   formed.	  Methodological	   naturalism	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   the	  method	   of	   empirical	   sciences,	   or	   continuity	  with	   the	   empirical	   sciences,	   is	   not	  adequate	   to	   this	   challenge.	  While	   it	   is	   the	   case	   that	   at	   times	  Nietzsche	   praises	  scientific	  method,	  his	  points	  of	  connection	  with	  the	  wider	  scientific	  approach	  do	  not	  sufficiently	  characterize	  his	  method.	  The	  virtues	  he	  at	  one	  time	  celebrates	  in	  science	   he	   comes	   to	   see	   as	   yet	   to	   be	   fully	   realized.	   I	   will	   now	   discuss	   how	  solitude,	   skepticism	   and	   attention	   to	   the	   body	   operate	   as	  mutually	   reinforcing	  habits	  that	  form	  Nietzsche’s	  methodological	  naturalism	  and	  allow	  the	  translation	  of	  man	  back	  into	  nature	  that	  Nietzsche	  diagnoses	  as	  lacking.	  	  	  Essential	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  method	  is	  the	  practice	  of	  solitude.38	  Solitude,	  and	  the	  desert	   in	  which	   it	   is	  experienced,	  are	  associated	  by	  Nietzsche	  with	  genuine	  truthfulness:	   “It	   is	   always	   in	   deserts	   that	   the	   truthful	   have	   dwelt”	   (Z	   II	   8).	   He	  asks,	  “who	  today	  knows	  what	  solitude	  is?”	  (HH	  I	  Preface	  3)	  While	  the	  likes	  of	  Rée	  and	   Guyau	   might	   attack	   existing	   dogma,	   they	   lack	   the	   capacity	   for	   solitude	  required	   to	   recognize	  what	   lies	   beneath	  modern	  man	   or	   to	   question	   the	  most	  cherished	   common	   values.	   Solitude	   is	   both	   a	   pre-­‐condition	   and	   result	   of	  undertaking	   the	   task	   of	   translating	   man	   back	   into	   nature.	   It	   acts	   to	   facilitate	  further	   aspects	   of	   the	   method	   of	   re-­‐naturalization	   and	   understanding	   man	   in	  natural	   terms,	   which	   I	   will	   discuss	   below.	   It	   is	   also	   made	   inevitable	   by	   the	  distance	   that	   emerges	   between	   those	  who	   take	   up	   this	  method	   and	   the	  moral	  human	  being.	  A	   second	   aspect	   of	   Nietzsche’s	   naturalistic	   method	   is	   a	   capacity	   for	  uncertainty,	   or	   a	   species	   of	   skepticism,	   that	   he	   thinks	   has	   not	   yet	   been	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demonstrated	   by	   his	   contemporaries.	   This	   element	   of	   Nietzsche’s	   method	  connects	  with	  the	  respect	  that	  he	  often	  shows	  for	  scientific	  method.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  Human	  all	  too	  Human,	  he	  believed	  scientists	  exemplified	  the	  capacity	  for	   uncertainty	  which	  was	   necessary	   to	   letting	   go	   of	  metaphysical	   and	   theistic	  prejudices	   that	   constrained	   enquiry.	   He	   declared	   with	   approval	   that	   “science	  [Wissenschaft]	  needs	  doubt	  and	  distrust	  for	  its	  closest	  allies”	  (HH	  I	  22),	  and	  “the	  scientific	   spirit	   [wissenschaftlichen	   Geist]	   will	   bring	   to	   maturity	   that	   virtue	   of	  
cautious	  reserve”	  (HH	  I	  631).	  An	  awareness	  of	  the	  need	  to	  develop	  a	  capacity	  for	  doubt	   is	   not	   unique	   to	   Nietzsche.	   Rée	   also	   recognized	   the	   importance	   of	   a	  skeptical,	  or	   cautious,	  attitude	   towards	  belief	  and	  opinion	  and	  warned	   that	   the	  discomfort	   of	   doubt	   might	   lead	   us	   to	   hold	   fast	   to	   our	   opinions.39	   Nietzsche,	  however,	  distinguishes	  between	  existing	  and	  required	  skepticism.40	  He	  claims	  of	  the	   nature	   of	   existing	   skepticism	   that:	   “skepticism	   is	   the	   most	   spiritual	  expression	   of	   a	   certain	   complex	   physiological	   condition	   called	   in	   ordinary	  language	  nervous	  debility	  and	  sickliness”	  (BGE	  208).	  This	  criticism,	  or	  diagnosis,	  of	   skeptics	   does	   not	   imply	   a	   rejection	   of	   all	   skepticism	   however.41	   Nietzsche	  speaks	   of	   a	   “new	   and	   stronger	   species	   of	   skepticism”	   bred	   in	   solitude,	   “which	  does	   not	   believe	   yet	   retains	   itself”	   (BGE	   209).	   The	   skepticism	   that	   Nietzsche	  advocates	   does	   not	   express	   indifference	   or	   an	   inability	   to	   commit	   to,	   or	   own,	  one’s	   drives.	   Rather,	   it	   represents	   the	   strength	   to	   live	   without	   certainties	   and	  without	  belief	   in	  unchanging	   truths	  and	  values.	   It	   requires	  one	   to	  embrace	   the	  change	   that	   the	  will	   to	  power	  constantly	  produces.	  Such	  skeptics	  have	  no	  need	  “of	  an	  external	  regulation	  to	  constrain	  and	  steady	  them”	  (AC	  54).	  Given	  that	  the	  self	   has	   no	   impervious	   boundaries	   or	   fixed	   essence,	   the	   idea	   is	   not	   to	   replace	  external	  regulations	  with	  ‘internal’	  ones	  found	  through	  introspection.	  Rather,	  re-­‐
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naturalized	  man,	  more	  aware	  both	  of	  the	  particular	  drives	  that	  contingently	  form	  their	  evolving	  self	  and	  of	  the	  creative	  process	  of	  change,	  takes	  responsibility	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  their	  own	  values.	  This	  alienates	  them	  from	  the	  herd,	  which	  rests	  on	  a	  system	  of	  universal,	  fixed	  values	  and	  beliefs.	  This	  new	  species	  of	  skepticism	  thus	  depends	  on	  a	  readiness	  to	  be	  solitary	  and	  apart	  from	  the	  herd.	  	  Nietzsche	   finds	   this	   stronger	   species	   of	   skepticism	   lacking	   in	   his	  contemporaries.	  The	   “pale	  atheists,	  Antichrists,	  nihilists,	   these	  skeptics	   […]	  still	  
believe	   in	   Truth”	   (GM	   III	   24).	   Hence,	   they	   neither	   go	   deep	   enough	   in	   their	  skepticism	   or	   investigation.	   At	   the	   same	   time	   as	   recognizing	   a	   value	   in	   its	  emphasis	  on	  doubt,	  Nietzsche	  criticizes	  science	  because	  it	  still	  assumes	  the	  value	  of	   truth.	   “Strictly	   speaking,	   there	   is	   no	   science	   ‘without	   presuppositions’.	   The	  idea	  of	  such	  a	  science	  is	  unimaginable,	  paralogical:	  a	  philosophy,	  a	  ‘belief’,	  must	  always	   be	   there	   first,	   so	   that	   with	   it	   science	   can	   have	   a	   direction,	   a	   sense,	   a	  border,	  a	  method,	  a	  right	  to	  exist”	  (GM	   III	  24).	  In	  contrast,	  a	  skepticism	  born	  of	  strength	   and	   cultivated	   in	   conditions	   of	   solitude,	   need	   not	   assume	   the	  redemptive	  power	  of	  truth.	  In	  thinkers	  such	  as	  Comte,	  however,	  who	  hoped	  that	  science	  would	  pave	  the	  way	  to	  Utopia,	  and	  even	  with	  Guyau,	  who	  had	  faith	  in	  the	  power	   of	   altruism,	   naturalistic	   investigation	   is	   still	   associated	   with	   the	  redemption	  of	  man	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  heaven	  on	  earth.42	  	  The	  goal	  of	  social	  and	  moral	  improvement	  is	  one	  that	  sets	  boundaries	  to	  naturalistic	   investigation.	   To	   undertake	   the	   task	   of	   translating	   man	   back	   into	  nature	  with	  genuine	  skepticism,	  which	  means	  to	  undertake	  it	  without	  the	  belief	  that	  truth	  will	  serve	  humanity,	  is	  a	  truly	  solitary	  undertaking.	  It	  is	  only	  without	  the	   need	   to	   believe	   that	   one’s	   labors	   will	   lead	   to	   mankind’s	   happiness	   or	  redemption,	   however,	   and	   in	   solitude	   from	   the	   opinions	   of	   others,	   that	   the	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investigation	  into	  the	  text	  underlying	  moral	  man	  can	  be	  unconstrained.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  lone	  scholar	  is	  warmed	  by	  his	  belief	  that	  he	  is	  serving	  mankind,	  they	  are	  not	   truly	   alone,	   he	   does	   not	   have	   to	   endure	   a	   solitude	   which	   “encircles	   and	  embraces	   him,	   ever	   more	   threatening,	   suffocating,	   heart-­‐tightening”	   (HH	   I	  Preface	  3).	  As	   long	  as	  scholars	  presuppose	  the	  value	  of	  truth	  as	  that	  which	  will	  redeem	  man,	  their	  investigation	  cannot	  go	  beyond	  the	  limits	  set	  by	  the	  values	  of	  Christian	  morality.	  Nietzsche’s	  method	  requires	  a	  more	  extreme	  skepticism,	  one	  in	  which	   the	   task	   of	   translating	  man	   back	   into	   nature	   is	   not	   conducted	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  a	  project	  rooted	  in	  Christian	  morality.	  	  A	  third	  crucial	  dimension	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  method	  is	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  body	   and	   its	   multiplicity	   of	   drives.	   Nietzsche’s	   method	   opposes	   a	   history	   of	  philosophy	   whose	   practitioners	   “saw	   the	   senses	   as	   trying	   to	   lure	   them	   away	  from	  their	  world,	  from	  the	  cold	  kingdom	  of	  ‘ideas’,	  to	  a	  dangerous	  Southern	  isle”	  (GS	  372).	  He	  inverts	  Plato’s	  criticism	  of	  the	  sight	  and	  sound	  lovers	  who	  are	  too	  distracted	  to	  contemplate	  the	  pure	  forms.43	  For	  Nietzsche	  it	  is	  the	  so-­‐called	  pure	  perceivers	  who,	  in	  their	  denial	  of	  the	  body,	  are	  impure	  and	  must	  be	  confronted	  as	  “lechers”,	   “cowards”,	  and	  “habitual	   liars”	  (Z	   II	  On	  the	  Famous	  Wise	  Men).	  To	  overcome	   this	   history	   requires	   that	  we	   embrace	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   senses,	  and	   learn	   to	   listen	   to	   the	   various	  bodily	   drives	   and	  perspectives	   that	   form	   the	  self.44	  This	  self-­‐awareness	  concerning	  the	  operation	  and	  character	  of	  our	  drives	  is	  necessary	  if	  we	  are	  to	  grasp	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power,	  which	  forms	  the	  basis	   of	   Nietzsche’s	   naturalistic	   explanations	   and	   critique	   of	   morality.	   This	  requires	  the	  cultivation	  of	  new	  habits.	  Becoming	  aware	  of	  and	  attending	  to	  our	  drives	  demands	  that	  we	  confront	   the	  ongoing	  process	   in	  which	  they	  have	  been	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sublimated	  and	  re-­‐interpreted.	  This	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  recognize	  their	  character	  as	  will	  to	  power.	  	  Attention	  to	  the	  activity	  of	  our	  drives	  is	   facilitated	  by	  solitude.	  Alone	  we	  can	  hear	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  multiple,	  sometimes	  competing,	  drives	  within	  us.	  This	  experience	  is	  challenging	  and	  disturbing.	  Hence,	  “We	  are	  afraid	  that	  when	  we	  are	  alone	   and	   quiet	   something	   will	   be	   whispered	   into	   our	   ear,	   and	   so	   we	   hate	  quietness	  and	  deafen	  ourselves	  with	  sociability.”	  (UT	  Schopenhauer	  as	  Educator	  5)	  Further,	   the	  capacity	   to	  endure	  solitude	  and	  skepticism	  concerning	  even	  the	  value	   of	   truth	   in	   serving	   humanity,	   is	   necessary	   to	   accept	   the	   implications	   of	  what	   we	   hear,	   which	   will	   challenge	   our	   morality	   and	   our	   self-­‐understanding.	  Thus,	   the	   likes	  of	  Rée	  and	  Guyau,	   confined	  by	   their	   attachment	   to	  herd	  values,	  will	   remain	   deaf	   to	   much	   of	   what	   might	   be	   heard	   in	   solitary	   attention	   to	   the	  body.	   Developing	   the	   habit,	   facilitated	   by	   solitude,	   of	   listening	   to	   the	   various	  drives	   within	   us	   is	   a	   step	   towards	   being	   able	   to	   occupy	   a	   wider	   variety	   of	  perspectives.45	  We	  must	   learn	  “to	   look	   into	   the	  world	   through	  as	  many	  eyes	  as	  possible,	  to	  live	  in	  drives	  and	  activities	  so	  as	  to	  create	  eyes	  for	  ourselves”	  (KSA	  9:	  11[141)	  This	  allows	  a	  more	   ‘just’	  hearing	  of	  the	  perspectives	  that	  are	  currently	  suppressed.	  	  Precisely	  because	  man	  has	  within	  him	  many	  perspectives	  and	  “feels	  many	  pros	  and	  cons”	  he	  has	  the	  possibility	  to	  raise	  “himself	  to	  justice”	  (KSA	  11:	  26[182]/	   WP	   259).	   Richard	   Schacht	   suggests	   that	   together	   our	   multiple	  perspectives	   “constitute	   the	   means	   of	   compensating	   for	   their	   particular	  ‘injustices’	  sufficiently	   to	  bring	  the	  attainment	  of	   ‘justice’	  and	  the	  acquisition	  of	  ‘knowledge’	  so	  understood	  within	  the	  realm	  of	  possibility.”46	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  obtain	   a	   view	   from	   no	   perspective,	   and	   as	   Schacht	   argues,	   were	   it	   possible	   it	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would	  not	  give	  us	  a	  deeper	  knowledge.	  There	  are	  no	  pure	  objects	  of	  knowledge	  obtainable	   for	   us,	   but	   rather	   perspectives,	   or	   wills	   to	   power,	   which	   condition	  each	   other.	   What	   is	   ‘unjust’	   is	   to	   equate	   the	   interpretation	   of	   a	   particular	  perspective	   with	   an	   object	   as	   it	   is	   in	   itself.	   This	   arbitrarily	   excludes	   other	  interpretations	   and	   thus	   takes	   a	  narrow	  view	  of	   the	   subject	   of	   interpretations.	  We	  do	  greater	  ‘justice’	  to	  something	  when	  we	  try	  to	  occupy	  as	  many	  perspectives	  as	   possible,	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   develop	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   process	   of	  interpretation.47	  	  OBJECTIVE	  MAN	  It	  is	  precisely	  such	  ‘justice’	  that	  existing	  scientific	  method	  does	  not	  allow.	  In	  his	  claim	  to	  be	  disinterested	  and	  objective	  the	  scientific	  man	  fails	   to	  capture	  the	  multitude	  of	  perspectives.	  In	  the	  passage	  Leiter	  quotes	  from	  as	  evidence	  that	  Nietzsche	  is	  committed	  in	  his	  late	  work	  to	  scientific	  method,	  Nietzsche’s	  tone	  is	  in	  fact	  rather	  mocking	  of	  the	  objective	  researcher.48	  The	  “precious	  instrument”	  of	  the	  objective	  scientist	  Nietzsche	  describes	  thus:	  “only	  in	  his	  cheerful	  totalism	  can	  he	  remain	   ‘nature’	  and	   ‘natural’.	  His	  mirroring	  soul,	   for	  ever	  polishing	   itself,	  no	  longer	  knows	  how	  to	  affirm	  or	  how	  to	  deny”.	  Such	  a	  man	  “has	   to	   first	  wait	   for	  some	   content	   so	   as	   ‘to	   form’	   itself	   by	   it-­‐	   as	   a	   rule	   a	   man	   without	   content,	   a	  ‘selfless’	  man.”	   (BGE	  207)	  Hence,	   the	  value	  of	  disinterest	  practiced	   in	   scientific	  method	  comes	  together	  with	  the	  value	  of	  self-­‐sacrifice	   in	  the	  morality	  that	  19th	  century	  naturalists	  justify;	  both	  involve	  an	  inability	  to	  own	  and	  assert	  the	  wills	  to	  power	  that	  form	  the	  self.	  	  The	  ‘objective	  men’	  are	  incapable	  of	  knowing	  themselves.	  This	  claim	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  self.	  Already	  in	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his	  early	  notebooks,	  Nietzsche	  considers	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  unified	  enduring	  self	  as	  a	  fantasy;	  “We	  have	  a	  phantom	  of	  ‘I’	  in	  mind	  […]	  we	  want	  to	  create	  unity”	  (KSA	  8:	  32[8]).	   Our	   notion	   of	   ‘I’,	   as	   a	   unified	   subject	   who	   perceives	   and	   interprets,	  requires	  us	  to	  overlook	  our	  multiplicity.	  It	  is	  “an	  attempt,	  to	  see	  and	  conceive	  our	  
endlessly	  complex	  being	  in	  simplification.”	  (KSA	  9:	  7[62])	  The	  self	  is	  in	  fact	  made	  up	   of	   various	   wills	   to	   power,	   drives,	   habits,	   and	   patterns	   of	   behaviour.	   Their	  interaction	   is	   contingent	   and	   developing;	   there	   is	   no	   unchanging	   self.	   The	  attempt	  to	  isolate	  a	  limited	  part,	  or	  moment,	  of	  this	  interaction	  and	  fix	  it	  as	  the	  self	   is	   itself	   an	   interpretation	   that	   obscures	   the	  process	   of	   interpretation.	   	   The	  project	  of	  establishing	  a	  fixed	  nature,	  or	  self,	  runs	  contrary	  to	  Nietzsche’s	  method	  of	  naturalism;	  “for	  the	  enrichment	  of	  knowledge	  it	  may	  be	  of	  more	  value	  not	  to	  reduce	  oneself	  to	  uniformity	  in	  this	  way,	  but	  to	  listen	  instead	  to	  the	  gentle	  voice	  of	   each	   of	   life’s	   different	   situations”	   (HH	   I	   618).	   To	   achieve	   this	   implies	   a	  different	  understanding	  of	  the	  self:	  “ceasing	  to	  treat	  oneself	  as	  a	  single	  rigid	  and	  unchanging	   individuum”	  (HH	  I	  618).	   In	  order	   to	  know	  oneself	  one	  must	  accept	  that	  there	  is	  no	  unchanging	  self	  to	  know.	  	  The	  objective	  man,	  however,	  is	  wedded	  to	  a	  notion	  of	  self	  that	  excludes	  an	  awareness	   of	   the	   multiplicity	   of	   drives	   within	   them.	   The	   history	   they	   have	  inherited,	  from	  Plato	  and	  Christianity,	  is	  one	  in	  which	  mind	  or	  spirit	  is	  posited	  as	  separate	   from	   the	   body.	   This	   separation	   is	   one	   that	   Nietzsche	   repudiates.	   He	  insists	  “‘Pure	  spirit’	  [Geist]	  is	  pure	  stupidity:	  if	  we	  deduct	  the	  nervous	  system	  and	  the	   senses,	   the	   ‘mortal	   frame’,	   we	   miscalculate”	   (AC	   14).	   Of	   course,	   other	  naturalistic	  thinkers	  also	  reject	  mind	  body	  dualism.	  For	  them	  mind	  or	  spirit	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  body.	  They	  have,	  however,	   inherited	  the	  habit	  of	  denying	   their	   own	   sensuous	   nature.	  Unlike,	   “the	   rarest	   and	   best	   formed	  men”,	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such	  as	  Goethe,	  in	  whom	  “the	  spirit	  feels	  just	  as	  comfortable	  and	  at	  home	  in	  the	  senses	  as	  the	  senses	  feel	  at	  home	  and	  comfortable	  in	  the	  spirit”	  (KSA	  11:	  41[6]/	  WP	  1051),	   the	   ‘objective’	  men	  do	  not	   feel	   at	  home	   in	   their	  bodies,	   and	  are	  not	  comfortable	   acknowledging	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   their	   drives.	   Thus	   their	  monism	  still	   involves	   a	   suppression	   of	   the	   processes	   of	   the	   body.	  While	   their	   aim	   is	   to	  understand	  mind	  or	  spirit	  as	  continuous	  with	  the	  body	  they	  do	  this	  by	  excluding	  much	  of	   the	  activity	  of	   the	  body.	  Having	  suppressed	   the	  contradictions	  of	   their	  various	  drives	  the	  ‘objective’	  men	  are	  out	  of	  touch	  with	  their	  bodily	  drives.	  They	  cannot	   create	   direction	   and	   value	   from	   the	   flux	   of	   drives	  within	   them	  because	  they	   either	   condemn	  or	  deny	   altogether	   the	   activity	   of	   these	  drives.	   Instead	  of	  asserting	   their	   own	   interpretations	   and	   affirming	   their	   own	   perspectives	   they	  simply	  mirror	   the	   interpretations	  of	   the	  herd.	  Committed	   to	   the	  value	  of	   truth,	  understanding	  the	  purpose	  of	  science	  in	  the	  context	  of	  herd	  values,	  they	  remain	  men	   of	   faith	   rather	   than	   true	   skeptics.	   “Belief	   of	   any	   kind	   is	   an	   expression	   of	  selflessness,	  of	  self-­‐alienation”	  (AC	  54).	  For	  Nietzsche,	  both	  disinterest	  and	  self-­‐sacrifice	   imply	   a	   failure	   to	   affirm	   life.	  More	   specifically	   they	   imply	   a	   failure	   to	  affirm	   any	   of	   the	   particular	   interpretations	   of	   the	   particular	   drives	   within	   us.	  This	   lack	  of	   awareness	   and	  affirmation	  of	   any	  particular	   competing	  drives	   and	  their	  interpretations	  implies	  a	  lack	  of	  awareness	  and	  affirmation	  of	  our	  nature	  as	  made	   up	   of	   these	   competing	   drives.	   Further	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   awareness	   and	  affirmation	   of	   the	   creative	   process	   of	   interpretation	   that	   life	   as	   will	   to	   power	  consists	  in.	  The	   objective	   men,	   have	   no	   awareness	   of	   the	   complexity	   of	   competing	  wills	  to	  power	  which	  form	  them.	  They	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  operation	  of	  their	  own	  drives	  in	  their	  very	  assertion	  of	  impartiality.	  They	  are	  not	  natural	  in	  themselves	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and	  are	  not	  able	  to	  translate	  man	  back	  into	  nature	  on	  the	  level	  of	  understanding	  either.	  Hence,	  the	  translation	  of	  man	  into	  nature	  necessitates	  that	  we	  overcome	  the	  limitations	  of	  objective	  man.	  	  	  THE	  RE-­‐NATURALISATION	  OF	  MAN	  To	  translate	  man	  back	  into	  nature	  a	  new	  objectivity	  is	  needed,	  one	  which	  involves	   the	  awareness	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  perspectives	  as	  Nietzsche	   indicates	   in	  
On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  Morality:	  “to	  see	  differently	  and	  to	  want	  to	  see	  differently	  to	  that	   degree,	   is	   no	   small	   discipline	   and	   preparing	   of	   the	   intellect	   for	   its	   future	  ‘objectivity’	  –	  the	  latter	  understood	  not	  as	  ‘contemplation’	  [Anschauung]	  without	  interest	  (which	  is,	  as	  such,	  a	  non-­‐concept	  and	  an	  absurdity),	  but	  as	  having	  in	  our	  
power	   the	   ability	   to	   engage	  and	  disengage	  our	   ‘pros’	   and	   ‘cons’”	   (GM	   III	   12).	  A	  new	   self-­‐awareness	   of	   the	   activity	   of	   our	   interests	   is	   needed.	   To	   complete	   the	  task	   of	   translation	   on	   the	   level	   of	   understanding	   we	   must	   overcome	   the	  limitations	   of	   objective	   man.	   We	   are	   faced	   with	   “the	   task	   of	   assimilating	  
knowledge	  and	  making	  it	  instinctive”	  (GS	  11).	  This	   transformation,	   which	   is	   required	   in	   order	   to	   fulfill	   the	   project	   of	  translating	  man	  back	   into	   the	  nature,	   is	  brought	  about	   through	  attempting	   this	  task.	  Through	  employing	  Nietzsche’s	  method	  of	  naturalism	  we	  are	  changed	  such	  that	   we	   are	   able	   to	   more	   completely	   employ	   it,	   and	   will	   finally	   be	   able	   to	  incorporate	  the	  truth	  that	  man	  is	  will	  to	  power.	  In	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  denial	  of	   the	   body	   that	   the	   objective	  men	   suffer	   from,	  we	  must	   train	   ourselves	   to	   be	  more	   aware	   of	   our	   body	   and	   break	   the	   habit	   of	   ignoring	   the	   senses.	   This	   new	  awareness	   of	   our	   body	   and	  drives	   produces	   a	   new	  awareness	   of	   our	   pros	   and	  cons.	   It	   requires	   more	   than	   observation.	   To	   become	   emancipated	   from	   the	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ascetic	   ideal	   is	   a	   gradual	   process.	   To	   break	   the	   habit	   of	   ignoring	   the	   body	  we	  must	   live	   our	   pros	   and	   cons;	   we	   must	   be	   prepared	   to	   affirm	   and	   deny.	  	  Nietzsche’s	  method	  demands	   that	  we	  occupy	   different	   perspectives;	   something	  he	  does	  through	  his	  writing.	  In	  place	  of	  coolly	  observing	  them,	  we	  must	  learn	  to	  move,	   or	   rather	   dance,	   between	   them:	   “thinking	   needs	   to	   be	   learned	   just	   as	  dancing	   needs	   to	   be	   learned,	   as	   a	   form	   of	   dancing….	  Who	   is	   there	   among	   the	  Germans	  who	  knows	  from	  experience	  that	   light	  shiver	  which	  spreads	  out	  to	  all	  the	  muscles	   from	   light	   feet	   in	   intellectual	  matters!	   […]	   for	  dancing	   in	   any	   form	  cannot	  be	  divorced	  from	  a	  noble	  education,	  the	  ability	  to	  dance	  with	  the	  feet,	  with	  concepts	  with	  words”	  (TI	  What	  the	  Germans	  lack:	  7).	  Escaping	  the	  fixed	  values	  of	  the	   herd	   and	   retaining	   a	   skepticism	   that	   prevents	   one	   petrifying	   within	   one	  position	  allows	  us	  to	  live	  in	  and	  explore	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  our	  sensuality.	  This	  engagement	  with	  our	  own	  variety	  of	  perspectives	  in	  turn	  reinforces	  and	  deepens	   the	  new	  skepticism	  discussed	  above.	  The	   “spirit	   takes	   leave	  of	   all	  faith	  and	  every	  wish	  for	  certainty,	  practised	  as	  it	  is	  in	  maintaining	  itself	  on	  tight	  ropes	  and	  possibilities	  and	  dancing	  even	  beside	  abysses.”	  (GS	  347)	  Rather	  than	  a	  skepticism	  which	  attempts	  to	  dissociate	  from	  the	  multiplicity	  that	  forms	  the	  self,	  by	   holding	   itself	   apart	   from	   any	   ‘pros’	   and	   ‘cons’,	   we	   become	   capable	   of	   a	  skepticism	  born	  of	  an	  awareness	  of	   these	   ‘pros’	  and	   ‘cons’,	  which	  has	   learnt	   to	  engage	  and	  disengage	  with	  their	  full	  variety.	  Addressing	  those	  who	  would	  follow	  him	  in	  his	  method	  Nietzsche	  declares:	  “‘You	  shall	  get	  control	  over	  your	  For	  and	  Against	  and	  learn	  how	  to	  display	  first	  one	  and	  then	  the	  other	  in	  accordance	  with	  your	  ‘higher	  goal’.”	  (HH	  I	  Preface:	  6)	  Having	  first,	  through	  Nietzsche’s	  method	  of	  naturalism,	  become	  aware	  of	  the	  flux	  of	  wills	  to	  power	  that	  contingently	  form	  the	  self,	  re-­‐naturalized	  man	  is	  in	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a	  position	  to	  cultivate	  the	  “great	  and	  rare	  art”	  which	  enables	  one	  “to	  ‘give	  style’	  to	  one’s	  character”	  to	  “survey	  all	  the	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  that	  their	  nature	  has	   to	   offer	   and	   then	   fit	   them	   into	   an	   artistic	   plan”	   (GS	   290).	   Thus,	   they	   form	  their	  values	  through	  their	  own	  activity	  rather	  than	  mirroring	  herd	  values.	  	  Living	   for	  Nietzsche	   involves	  valuing.	   It	   is	   to	  prefer	  one	  form	  of	   life,	  one	  will	   to	   power,	   or	   combination	   of	   wills	   to	   power,	   over	   another.	   Nietzsche’s	  writings	  demonstrate	  such	  valuing.	  The	  new	  stronger	  skeptics,	  therefore,	  do	  not	  live	  without	  values.	  What	  they	  hold	  back	  from	  is	  constructing	  ideals	  out	  of	  these	  values.	  Instead	  they	  accept	  the	  status	  of	  their	  values	  as	  contingent,	  and	  transient,	  interpretations.	   Nietzsche	   understands	   himself	   as	   opposed	   to	   all	   fixed	   and	  transcendent	  ‘ideals’	  or	  ‘idols’	  (EH	  Foreword	  3).	  To	  attempt	  to	  solidify	  our	  pros	  and	  cons	  into	  enduring	  values	  is	  to	  project	  them	  beyond	  the	  flux	  from	  which	  they	  emerge.	   	  Nietzsche	  is	  aware	  of	  this	  danger,	  but	  he	  hopes	  that	  the	  experiment	  of	  translating	  man	  back	   into	  nature	  will	   allow	  us	   to	   escape	   the	  need	   to	   construct	  new	  idols.	  	  CONCLUSION	  Nietzsche’s	  method	  involves	  a	  capacity	  for	  solitude	  that	  allows	  a	  new	  kind	  of	   skepticism	   and	   a	   new	   level	   of	   attention	   to	   the	   body	   than	   has	   yet	   been	  achieved.	  A	  new	  awareness	  of	   the	  nature	  of	  our	  underlying	  drives	   involves	   the	  incorporation	  of	   truths	   that	  radically	  challenge	  our	  existing	  self-­‐understanding.	  It	  requires	  becoming	  “investigators	  to	  the	  point	  of	  cruelty,	  with	  rash	  fingers	  for	  the	   ungraspable,	   with	   teeth	   and	   stomach	   for	   the	   most	   indigestible,	   ready	   for	  every	   task	   that	  demands	  acuteness	  and	  sharp	  senses,	   ready	   for	  every	  venture”	  (BGE	  44).	  Only	  those	  capable	  of	  this	  will	  recognize	  the	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  will	  to	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power	  and	  be	  able	   to	   incorporate	  such	  painful	   insights.	  This	   incorporation	  will	  serve	  to	  distance	  them	  from	  the	  herd	  and	  induce	  further	  solitude.	  49	  	  How	   do	   we	   know	   that	   we	   have	   successfully	   avoided	   attachment	   to	  existing	  ideals	  and	  are	  suitably	  skeptical,	  solitary,	  and	  engaged	  with	  the	  senses,	  in	   embarking	   on	   our	   project	   of	   translation?	  We	   can	   only	   continue	   to	   examine	  ourselves	   and	   our	   motives,	   purifying	   ourselves	   from	   instances	   of	   denying	   the	  involvement	  of	  various	  drives,	  such	  as	  a	  drive	  to	  certainty,	  to	  fixity,	  to	  approval	  from	  others,	  by	  revealing	  their	  operation	  in	  our	  existing	  behavior	  and	  system	  of	  beliefs.	   To	   live	   non-­‐ascetically,	   is	   not	   to	   deny	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   drive	   to	  asceticism.	   Rather	   it	   is	   to	   own	   it	   and	   employ	   it	   in	   exposing,	   and	   ultimately	  becoming	  at	  home	  in,	  the	  drives	  that	  have	  been	  sublimated	  and	  denied	  under	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  ascetic	  ideal.	  	  The	   superiority	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  method	  of	  naturalism	  depends	   in	  part	  on	  its	  success	  in	  cultivating	  individuals	  who	  are	  able	  to	  overcome	  the	  ascetic	   ideal	  and	   affirm	   the	   interpretation	   of	   life	   that	   they	   reach,	   and	   in	   part	   on	   how	  convincing	   an	   interpretation	   it	   yields.	   We	   cannot	   establish	   competing	  interpretations	   as	   true	   by	   reference	   to	   a	   unchanging	   standard	   free	   from	  interpretation.	   We	   can,	   however,	   demonstrate	   the	   presence	   of	   interpretations	  where	   they	   are	   denied	   by	   exploring	   the	   operation	   of	   interpreting	   perspectives	  behind	   the	   denial.	   We	   can	   demonstrate	   the	   exclusion	   of	   perspectives	   by	  occupying	   a	   greater	   variety	   of	   perspectives.	   Finally,	   we	   can	   find	   the	  interpretation	  which	  we	  arrive	  at	  more	  or	   less	  convincing	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  our	   experiences.	   The	   interpretation	   that	   Nietzsche	   believes	   best	   explains	   the	  phenomenon	   we	   encounter,	   including	   the	   immodest	   tendency	   to	   deny	   the	  presence	  of	  interpretation,	  is	  the	  view	  that	  everything	  is	  will	  to	  power.	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The	  method	  which	  he	  believes	  will	  persuade	  us	  to	  this	  view	  of	  the	  world	  has	   to	  be	   lived	  and	  actively	  engaged	   in.	   It	   cannot	  be	   reduced	   to	  a	   theory	   to	  be	  applied	   to	   scholarly	   investigation.	   One	   should	   live	   by	   the	   principle	   “Life	   as	   a	  
means	  to	  knowledge”	  (GS	  324).	  As	  a	   lived	  method	   it	  affects	   the	   individuals	  who	  undertake	   it.	   By	  becoming	  more	   aware	  of	   their	   drives,	   and	   incorporating	   their	  new	   knowledge,	   those	   who	   undertake	   Nietzsche’s	   task	   undergo	   a	   re-­‐naturalization.	   This	   re-­‐naturalization	   is	   symbiotic	   with	   understanding	   man	   in	  natural	  terms;	  both	  aspects	  are	  required	  by	  Nietzsche’s	  naturalistic	  method	  and	  both	   are	   involved	   in	   translating	   man	   back	   into	   nature.	   Thus,	   Nietzsche’s	  naturalistic	  method	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  existential	  in	  so	  far	  as	  it	  is	  must	  be	  actively	  engaged	  in,	  forming	  part	  of	  how	  a	  life	  is	  lived,	  and	  is	  transformative	  of	  those	  who	  undertake	  it.	  	  Further,	  it	  creates	  the	  conditions	  that	  would	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  kind	  of	  existential	   naturalism	   discussed	   by	   Hatab,	   in	   which	   we	   respond	   to	   the	  implications	  of	  relinquishing	  supernatural	  interpretations.	  By	  allowing	  one	  to	  be	  more	   in	   touch	   with	   ones	   drives	   and	   challenging	   the	   beliefs	   and	  methods	   that	  Nietzsche	   analyzes	   as	   ascetic	   and	   inimical	   to	   life,	   Nietzsche’s	   methodological	  naturalism	  enables	   its	   practitioners	   to	   find	   their	   “way	  back	   to	   ‘virtue’,	   ‘health’,	  happiness”	   (TI	  Expeditions	  of	   an	  Untimely	  Man	  48),	   such	   that	   they	  might	  have	  the	   necessary	   strength,	   and	   awareness	   of	   their	   own	   pros	   and	   cons,	   to	   take	   on	  Nietzsche’s	   further	   challenges,	   however	   we	   construe	   them.	   Such	   challenges	  might	  include	  developing	  new	  virtues,	  breeding	  a	  higher	  type	  or,	  as	  emphasized	  by	  Hatab,	   thinking	   the	   eternal	   return.	   These	   practitioners	   of	   a	   new	  naturalism	  can	  hope	  to	  achieve	  “a	  ‘return	  to	  nature’,	  although	  it	  is	  not	  really	  a	  going-­‐back	  but	  a	   going-­up	   –	   up	   into	   a	   high,	   free,	   even	   frightful	   nature	   and	   naturalness”	   (TI	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Expeditions	   of	   an	   Untimely	   Man	   48).	   Ultimately	   Nietzsche’s	   methodological	  naturalism	  is	  itself	  an	  experiment	  and	  celebration	  of	  “the	  thought	  that	  life	  could	  be	  an	  experiment	  for	  the	  knowledge-­‐seeker”	  (GS	  324).	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  have	  referred	  to	  the	  following	  translations:	  The	  Birth	  of	  Tragedy	  and	  Other	  
Writings,	  trans.	  Ronald	  Speirs,	  ed.	  Raymond	  Geuss	  and	  Ronald	  Speirs	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1999);	  Untimely	  Meditations,	  trans.	  Reginald	  J.	  Hollingdale,	  ed.	  Daniel	  Breazeale	  (Cambridge;	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1997);	  Human,	  all	  too	  Human,	  trans.	  Reginald	  J.	  Hollingdale	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Gay	  Science,	  trans.	  Josefine	  Nauckhoff,	  ed.	  Bernard	  Williams	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001);	  Thus	  Spoke	  Zarathustra:	  a	  Book	  for	  Everyone	  and	  Nobody,	  trans.	  Graham	  Parkes	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005);	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil,	  trans.	  Reginald	  J.	  Hollingdale	  (London:	  Penguin,	  2003);	  On	  the	  Genealogy	  of	  Morality,	  trans.	  Carol	  Diethe,	  ed.	  Keith	  Ansell-­‐Pearson	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007);	  Twilight	  of	  the	  Idols	  and	  The	  Anti-­Christ,	  trans.	  Reginald	  J.	  Hollingdale	  (London:	  Penguin,	  2003);	  Ecce	  Homo:	  How	  One	  Becomes	  What	  One	  Is,	  trans.	  R.	  J.	  Hollingdale	  (London:	  Penguin	  Books,	  2004);	  The	  Will	  to	  Power,	  trans.	  Walter	  Kaufmann	  and	  Reginald.	  J.	  Hollingdale.	  (New	  York:	  Vintage	  books,	  1968);	  
Writings	  from	  the	  Late	  Notebooks,	  trans.	  K.	  Sturge,	  ed.	  R.	  Bittner	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  2	  In	  talking	  of	  19th	  century	  naturalistic	  thinkers	  I	  am	  not	  assuming	  membership	  of	  any	  one	  movement,	  or	  that	  these	  thinkers	  would	  have	  used	  the	  term	  ‘naturalism’	  to	  define	  their	  own	  thought.	  Hence,	  I	  am	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  historical	  provenance	  of	  the	  term	  itself.	  	  3	  Nietzsche	  does	  not	  discuss	  any	  group	  of	  thinkers	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  naturalism.	  He	  uses	  the	  term	  Naturalismus	  only	  three	  times	  in	  the	  published	  works,	  twice	  in	  relation	  to	  art	  and	  once	  in	  relation	  to	  morality	  (BT	  7,	  HH	  I	  221,	  TI	  Morality	  as	  Anti-­‐Nature	  4).	  What	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  here	  is	  that	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  many	  thinkers	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  who	  we	  now	  consider	  naturalistic	  in	  their	  approach,	  and	  who	  in	  different	  ways	  might	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  a	  task	  of	  translating	  man	  back	  into	  nature,	  Nietzsche	  believes	  this	  translation	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  achieved.	  He	  thus	  finds	  all	  attempts	  lacking	  and	  understands	  himself	  to	  be	  taking	  a	  unique	  approach.	  Thus,	  if	  we	  consider	  Nietzsche	  to	  be	  a	  naturalistic	  philosopher	  we	  must	  at	  the	  same	  time	  respect	  that	  his	  approach	  cannot	  to	  be	  reduced	  to	  what	  he	  shares	  with	  other	  broadly	  naturalistic	  thinkers.	  	  4	  Nietzsche’s	  understanding	  of	  philosophical	  method,	  both	  as	  a	  means	  of	  inquiry	  and	  as	  a	  way	  of	  life,	  is	  not	  static	  but	  in	  gradual	  development.	  This	  article	  focuses	  on	  the	  later	  formulation	  of	  his	  method	  as	  it	  emerges	  in	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  task	  of	  translating	  man	  back	  into	  nature.	  I	  am	  thus	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  his	  writings	  from	  1886	  onwards.	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  5	  For	  example	  Gregory	  Moore	  offers	  a	  detailed	  exploration	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  relationship	  to	  biological	  theory,	  exploring	  the	  biological	  metaphors	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  work	  in	  the	  context	  of	  19th	  century	  biology,	  particularly	  evolutionary	  theory	  (Nietzsche,	  Biology	  and	  Metaphor	  [Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2002]).	  	  	  6	  Keith	  Ansell-­‐Pearson,	  “Free	  Spirits	  and	  Free	  Thinkers:	  Nietzsche	  and	  Guyau	  on	  the	  Future	  of	  Morality,”	  in	  Nietzsche,	  Nihilism	  and	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  Future,	  ed.	  Jeffrey	  Metzger	  (New	  York;	  London:	  Continuum,	  2009).	  7	  Nietzsche	  describes	  him	  as	  “brave”.	  (KSA	  11:	  35[34])	  8	  For	  example,	  such	  criticism	  includes	  Nietzsche’s	  accusation	  that	  Comte	  wanted	  “to	  lead	  his	  Frenchmen	  to	  Rome	  via	  the	  détour	  of	  science”	  (TI	  Expeditions	  of	  an	  Untimely	  Man	  4),	  and	  made	  the	  “misunderstanding”	  of	  seeing	  humanity’s	  perfection	  as	  a	  goal	  (KSA	  11:	  26[232]).	  He	  mentions	  Guyau	  with	  Comte	  in	  a	  critical	  context:	  “the	  mild	  and	  lily-­‐livered	  concept	  ‘humanity’	  à	  la	  Comte	  and	  after	  Stuart	  Mill	  […]	  Is	  once	  again	  the	  cult	  of	  Christian	  morality	  under	  a	  new	  name…	  the	  freethinkers,	  e.g.	  Guyau”.	  (KSA	  	  12:	  10[170]/	  WP	  340).	  Spencer	  is	  criticized	  at	  several	  points	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  oeuvre	  including	  GS	  373	  and	  TI	  Expeditions	  of	  an	  Untimely	  Man	  37.	  Nietzsche	  accuses	  Spencer	  of	  misunderstanding	  the	  “essence	  of	  life,	  its	  will	  to	  power”	  because	  he	  sees	  life	  as	  “as	  an	  increasingly	  efficient	  inner	  adaptation	  to	  external	  circumstances	  (Herbert	  Spencer).”	  (GM	  II	  12)	  9	  Brian	  Leiter,	  Nietzsche	  on	  Morality	  (New	  York;	  London:	  Routledge,	  2002),	  3.	  	  10	  Ibid.	  7.	  11	  Lawrence	  J.	  Hatab,	  Nietzsche’s	  Life	  Sentence	  (New	  York;	  London:	  Routledge,	  2005),	  7.	  12	  Brian	  Leiter,	  Nietzsche	  on	  Morality	  (New	  York;	  London:	  Routledge,	  2002),	  6-­‐10.	  13	  Lawrence	  J.	  Hatab,	  Nietzsche’s	  Life	  Sentence	  (New	  York;	  London:	  Routledge,	  2005),	  7.	  14	  For	  example	  see,	  Christoph	  Cox	  Nietzsche	  Naturalism	  and	  Interpretation	  (Berkley;	  Los	  Angeles;	  London:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1999)	  and	  John	  Richardson,	  Nietzsche’s	  New	  Darwinism	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  Cox	  explores	  the	  theory	  of	  knowledge	  contained	  in	  Nietzsche’s	  work,	  exploring	  how	  Nietzsche	  is	  simultaneously	  a	  naturalist	  and	  asserts	  the	  irreducibility	  of	  interpretation.	  Richardson	  develops	  a	  reading	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power,	  which	  he	  maintains	  is	  present,	  if	  subordinate	  and	  not	  directly	  articulated,	  in	  which	  the	  character	  of	  drives	  as	  will	  to	  power	  is	  itself	  explained	  according	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  natural	  selection.	  	  15	  Thomas	  Brobjer,	  Nietzsche’s	  Philosophical	  Context	  (Urbana:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  2008),	  esp.	  40-­‐2,	  64,	  103.	  16	  R.	  J.	  Hollingdale,	  Nietzsche:	  The	  Man	  and	  His	  Philosophy	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  90.	  	  17	  As	  documented	  by	  Brendan	  Donnellan,	  a	  shared	  interest	  in	  the	  French	  moralists	  was	  also	  a	  significant	  influence	  on	  the	  development	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  own	  distinct	  position	  at	  this	  point	  in	  his	  career	  (“Nietzsche	  and	  Paul	  Rée;	  Cooperation	  and	  Conflict”,	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Ideas,	  43	  (1982):	  595-­‐612).	  18	  Brobjer,	  Nietzsche’s	  Philosophical	  Context,	  248.	  19	  Ansell-­‐Pearson,	  “Free	  Spirits	  and	  Free	  Thinkers:	  Nietzsche	  and	  Guyau	  on	  the	  Future	  of	  Morality.”	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  20	  Ibid.	  104.	  For	  Nietzsche	  this	  conception	  of	  life	  will	  be	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power:	  “Where	  I	  found	  the	  living,	  there	  found	  I	  will	  to	  power”	  (Z	  II	  12),	  “life	  as	  such	  is	  will	  to	  power”	  (BGE	  13),	  and	  “I	  consider	  life	  itself	  instinct	  for	  growth	  for	  continuation,	  for	  accumulation	  of	  forces,	  for	  power”	  (AC	  6).	  21	  Ansell-­‐Pearson,	  “Free	  Spirits	  and	  Free	  Thinkers:	  Nietzsche	  and	  Guyau	  on	  the	  Future	  of	  Morality.”	  107;	  Jean-­‐Marie	  Guyau,	  A	  Sketch	  of	  Morality	  Independent	  of	  
Obligation	  or	  Sanction,	  trans.	  Gerturde	  Kapteyn	  (London:	  Watts	  &	  Co,	  1898),	  54.	  22	  Jean-­‐Marie	  Guyau,	  The	  Non-­religion	  of	  the	  Future,	  a	  Sociological	  Study	  (London:	  William	  Heinemann,	  1897),	  445.	  23	  Donnellan,	  “Nietzsche	  and	  Paul	  Rée;	  Cooperation	  and	  Conflict”,	  601.	  24	  Paul,	  Rée,	  	  “The	  Origin	  of	  the	  Moral	  Sensations”	  in	  Basic	  Writings,	  trans.	  Robin	  Small	  (Urbana;	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  2003),	  92.	  25	  Guyau,	  The	  Non-­religion	  of	  the	  Future,	  403.	  26	  Brobjer,	  Nietzsche’s	  Philosophical	  Context,	  102.	  27	  Guyau,	  The	  Non-­religion	  of	  the	  Future,	  398.	  	  28	  Alfred	  Fouillèe,	  “The	  Ethics	  of	  Nietzsche	  and	  Guyau”,	  International	  Journal	  of	  
Ethics	  13	  (1902):	  13-­‐27,	  24.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  suggest	  that	  Nietzsche	  is	  not	  an	  ethical	  thinker.	  I	  would	  temper	  Fouillèe’s	  comment	  to	  say	  that	  Nietzsche	  would	  have	  us	  do	  away	  with	  existing	  morality,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  particular	  values	  it	  espouses	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  understanding	  of	  duty	  as	  a	  universal	  imperative	  and	  external	  regulation.	  29	  Translation	  modified.	  	  30	  “Homo	  natura:	  The	  will	  to	  power”	  (KSA	  12:	  2[131]/	  WP	  391).	  31	  Moore,	  Nietzsche,	  Biology	  and	  Metaphor;	  Wolfgang	  Müller-­‐Lauter,	  Nietzsche:	  
His	  Philosophy	  of	  Contradictions	  and	  the	  Contradictions	  of	  His	  Philosophy,	  trans.	  by	  David	  J	  Parent	  (Urbana:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  1999).	  Moore	  chronicles	  Nietzsche’s	  reading	  of	  contemporary	  physiologists	  such	  as	  Wilhelm	  Roux	  (1850-­‐1924),	  and	  Michel	  Foster	  (1836-­‐1907).	  Moore	  suggests	  that	  these	  scientific	  developments	  serve	  to	  challenge	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  unitary	  subject	  and	  thus	  inform	  Nietzsche’s	  concept	  of	  a	  self	  formed	  by	  multiple	  wills	  to	  power.	  Müller-­‐Lauter,	  argues	  that	  for	  Nietzsche	  contradictions	  are	  constitutive	  of	  the	  world,	  as	  it	  is	  made	  up	  of	  inherently	  contradictory	  wills	  to	  power.	  His	  monograph	  ends	  with	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  Roux’s	  influence	  on	  Nietzsche’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  individual	  organism	  as	  a	  struggle	  and	  competition	  between	  its	  parts	  (163).	  	  	  32	  Moore,	  Nietzsche,	  Biology	  and	  Metaphor,	  39.	  	  33	  Nietzsche	  first	  read	  Lange	  in	  1866	  and	  returned	  to	  him	  when	  preparing	  his	  later	  texts.	  For	  the	  full	  dates	  when	  Nietzsche	  read	  Lange’s	  work	  see	  Brobjer	  
Nietzsche’s	  Philosophical	  Context,	  249.	  34	  Müller-­‐Lauter,	  Nietzsche:	  His	  Philosophy	  of	  Contradictions	  and	  the	  
Contradictions	  of	  His	  Philosophy,	  19.	  35	  John	  Richardson,	  Nietzsche’s	  System	  	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  36This	  is	  noted	  by	  Ansell-­‐Pearson,	  “Free	  Spirits	  and	  Free	  Thinkers:	  Nietzsche	  and	  Guyau	  on	  the	  Future	  of	  Morality,”	  107.	  Nietzsche’s	  annotations	  are	  listed	  in	  the	  German	  translation	  (Leipzig,	  1912)	  of	  Guyau’s	  A	  Sketch	  of	  Morality	  Independent	  
of	  Obligation	  or	  Sanction	  (Brobjer,	  Nietzsche’s	  Philosophical	  Context,	  234).	  37	  It	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  article	  to	  assess	  whether	  Nietzsche	  is	  justified	  in	  the	  assessment	  that	  if	  life	  is	  will	  to	  power,	  the	  ascetic	  ideal,	  and	  the	  values	  of	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  and	  pity,	  are	  inimical	  to	  healthy	  life,	  and	  whether	  Nietzsche’s	  notion	  of	  health	  then	  provides	  sufficient	  grounds	  to	  reject	  these	  values.	  38	  Horst	  Hutter	  offers	  a	  more	  general	  discussion	  of	  the	  possibilities	  of	  solitude	  as	  a	  technique	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  (Shaping	  the	  Future;	  Nietzsche’s	  Regime	  of	  the	  Soul	  
and	  its	  Ascetic	  Practices	  [Lanham;	  Oxford:	  Lexington	  Books,	  2006]).	  39	  Rée,	  “Psychological	  Observations”,	  in	  Basic	  Writings,	  9.	  40	  Nietzsche	  discusses	  different	  variants	  of	  skepticism.	  For	  my	  purposes	  what	  is	  significant	  is	  that	  in	  Beyond	  Good	  and	  Evil	  he	  considers	  prior	  forms	  of	  skepticism	  to	  be	  inadequate	  and	  demands	  the	  development	  of	  a	  new	  form	  of	  skepticism.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  comments	  concerning	  different	  variants	  of	  skepticism	  and	  their	  representatives	  see	  Andreas	  Ur	  Sommer	  (‘Nihilism	  and	  Skepticism	  in	  Nietzsche’,	  in	  A	  Companion	  to	  Nietzsche,	  ed.	  Keith	  Ansell-­‐Pearson	  [Malden,	  MA;	  Oxford;	  Carlton:	  Blackwell	  Publishing,	  2006]	  250-­‐270,	  esp.	  259-­‐260).	  41	  That	  Nietzsche	  continues	  to	  value	  skepticism	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  criticizing	  variants	  of	  skepticism	  and	  particular	  thinkers	  described	  as	  skeptics	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  Antichrist.	  	  Here	  we	  find	  both	  the	  claim	  that	  most	  skeptics	  are	  “ignorant	  of	  the	  first	  requirements	  of	  intellectual	  integrity”	  and	  that	  “The	  vigor	  of	  a	  mind	  [Geist],	  its	  freedom	  through	  strength	  and	  superior	  strength,	  is	  proved	  by	  skepticism	  […]	  the	  capacity	  for	  an	  unconstrained	  view,	  pertains	  to	  strength	  .	  .	  .	  .”	  (AC	  54)	  42	  Comte	  believed	  that	  social	  science	  could	  solve	  man’s	  social	  woes	  and	  that	  increasing	  humanity’s	  self-­‐understanding	  would	  set	  us	  on	  a	  path	  towards	  a	  social	  utopia	  (Auguste	  Comte,	  Introduction	  to	  Positive	  Philosophy,	  trans.	  Frederick	  Ferré	  	  [Indianapolis:	  Hackett,	  1988],	  28-­‐30).	  43	  “Those	  who	  love	  looking	  and	  listening	  are	  delighted	  by	  beautiful	  sounds	  and	  colors	  and	  shapes,	  and	  the	  works	  of	  art	  that	  make	  use	  of	  them,	  but	  their	  minds	  are	  incapable	  of	  seeing	  and	  delighting	  in	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	  beauty	  itself.”	  (Plato,	  The	  Republic,	  trans.	  D.	  Lee	  [London:	  Penguin,	  2003],	  476b	  [Stephanus	  Pagination]).	  	  44	  Graham	  Parkes	  gives	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  understanding	  of	  drives	  (Graham	  Parkes,	  Composing	  the	  Soul;	  Reaches	  of	  Nietzsche’s	  Psychology	  [Chicago;	  London:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1994]).	  Hutter	  also	  speaks	  of	  a	  requirement	  on	  free	  spirits	  to	  “listen	  to	  their	  bodies”	  (Shaping	  the	  Future;	  Nietzsche’s	  Regime	  
of	  the	  Soul	  and	  its	  Ascetic	  Practices,	  29).	  45	  Richardson	  discusses	  Nietzsche’s	  Perspectivism	  in	  terms	  of	  occupying	  different	  viewpoints	  (Nietzsche’s	  System,	  264).	  46	  Richard	  Schacht,	  Nietzsche	  (London;	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  1983),	  103.	  47	  Given	  justice	  is	  a	  central	  value	  of	  Christian	  morality,	  Nietzsche’s	  use	  of	  this	  term	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  virtue	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  knowledge	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  tension	  with	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  ascetic	  ideal.	  His	  understanding	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power,	  however,	  underscores	  a	  view	  in	  which	  the	  signification	  of	  a	  concept,	  value	  or	  virtue	  can	  change	  as	  it	  is	  incorporated	  and	  used	  by	  different	  forms	  of	  life.	  Thus	  justice	  as	  it	  has	  existed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  ascetic	  ideal	  can	  be	  overcome.	  	  The	  ‘justice’	  of	  a	  new	  method	  of	  truth	  which	  stands	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  ascetic	  ideal	  is	  thus	  contrasted	  to	  the	  meaning	  of	  ‘justice’	  within	  an	  ascetic	  understanding	  of	  truth,	  which	  conceived	  justice	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  impersonal	  and	  impartial.	  Nietzsche’s	  chooses	  this	  term	  precisely	  because	  of	  its	  association	  with	  the	  ascetic	  ideal.	  He	  hopes	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  hypocrisy	  contained	  in	  the	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  existing	  idea	  of	  justice,	  which	  asserts	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  impersonal	  and	  the	  objective	  from	  a	  partial	  position.	  Thus,	  he	  shows	  how	  what	  is	  understood	  as	  ‘just’	  has	  been	  unjust	  and	  contrasts	  it	  to	  a	  new	  virtue	  of	  justice.	  48	  Leiter,	  Nietzsche	  on	  Morality,	  21.	  49	  This	  might	  also	  apply	  to	  an	  alternative,	  but	  equally	  challenging,	  characterization	  of	  the	  Grundtext	  of	  homo	  natura,	  other	  than	  the	  particular	  analysis	  that	  Nietzsche	  offers	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  will	  to	  power.	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